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Subsistence Needs and Individual Duties 
Abstract 
 
Various human rights documents list the human right to an adequate standard of living. While the 
content of the duties of States and non-State actors are being made increasingly clear, the duties we 
have as individuals with regard to this human right are left nearly completely undefined. This article 
therefore wishes to clarify, firstly which duties towards the global poor we have as individuals and, 
secondly, what the status of these duties is. I will argue that nearly all our duties that stem from global 
subsistence needs are at present duties of virtue. I will arrive at this conclusion in two steps. Section I 
will aim to provide an exhaustive overview of our individual duties related to global subsistence needs. 
Next, Section II will need to ascertain the status of each of these duties. Accordingly, it will first have 
to offer definitions of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, and of the difference between 
duties of justice and duties of virtue. Subsequently, these definitions will be applied to the duties 
presented in Section I. Finally, I will conclude with a brief reflection on the significance of virtue as a 
necessary complement to justice. 
  
KEYWORDS: Human rights; individual duties; global poverty; subsistence needs; virtue; perfect and imperfect 
duties. 
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Introduction 
It is one thing to provide a declaration of human rights; it is quite another to clarify and 
allocate the duties to which these rights give rise. The latter task is especially formidable in the case 
of subsistence rights, which will be under discussion here. Both the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognize 
such rights as human rights under the name of a human right to an adequate standard of living (Article 
25 and Article 11 respectively). Human rights law has taken considerable steps forward in defining 
the content and scope of State duties to prevent and alleviate poverty. The duties of non-State actors 
are discussed less and in a vaguer fashion, but human rights law has begun to rectify this oversight.1 
Yet when it comes to the duties of individuals, a crushing silence reigns. Nowhere in the various 
covenants and declarations on human rights, the General Comments of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), or in the work of human rights scholars, are we provided an 
adequate treatment of the duties of individuals that spring from this right. Individual duties are 
offered perfunctory mention at best. Thus the CESCR, for example, in its General Comments – 
which are meant to elucidate the rights listed in the Covenant and allocate the corresponding duties – 
simply mentions that all members of society (including individuals) “have responsibilities in the 
realization of the right to food,”2 but leaves the question of the exact content and status of these 
“responsibilities”3 wide open. In short, if we wish to know which duties we individuals have as a 
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consequence of Article 25 UDHR, we will not find any answers in human rights documents or in the 
General Comments of the CESCR. Are we to conclude that therefore individuals have no real duties 
regarding the right to an adequate standard of living? 
 
Not wishing to answer this question in a positive fashion, I will undertake an examination of 
our individual duties concerning the fulfillment of global subsistence needs. This will involve treating 
and answering questions such as the following: Why do we have duties to the global poor in the first 
place? Are our individual duties to help the global poor positive or only negative? Are these best 
understood as duties of virtue or as duties of justice (claimable by right-holders and enforceable by 
legal means)? Are these strict, perfect duties, or wide, imperfect duties? The position I will defend is 
that most of our duties that stem from subsistence needs, prior to the creation of institutions that can 
pair specific right-holders to specific duty-bearers, are necessarily duties of virtue. 
 
 I will arrive at this conclusion in two steps. Section I will be centered on the question “Who 
has what duties in fulfilling subsistence needs?”. Are our duties limited to refraining from causing 
harm and offering compensation when actual harm is done, or ought we to lend a helping hand 
whenever it is in our power to do so? The goal of this first section will be to provide an exhaustive 
overview of our individual duties related to global subsistence needs. Next, Section II will need to 
ascertain the status of each of these duties. Accordingly, it will first have to offer definitions of the 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, and of the difference between duties of justice and 
duties of virtue. Subsequently, these definitions will be applied to the duties presented in Section I. 
Finally, I will conclude with a brief reflection on the significance of (duties of) virtue as a necessary 
complement to (duties of) justice. 
 
 
I. Who has what duties in fulfilling subsistence needs? 
 
In this subsection I wish to provide an overview of our individual duties regarding global 
subsistence needs. Hereby I will clarify which causes of poverty lead to which duties for whom. The 
status of these duties will then be determined in the next section. In order to arrive at such an overview, 
I will discuss several theories of such duties, most notably Peter Singer’s interactionist approach, which 
is focused solely on remedial responsibility, and Thomas Pogge’s institutional approach, which focuses 
solely on outcome responsibility.  
 
The only incontrovertible duty we have, on which all authors agree, is the negative duty to 
refrain from interfering directly with the ability of others to meet their own subsistence needs. If one’s 
actions directly harm this ability, then we incur positive obligations4 to remedy the loss we have caused. 
This is a case in which duties can be assigned by relying on what David Miller has termed outcome 
responsibility.5 This approach to responsibility typically holds that our duties are limited to refrain from 
causing harm and suffering, though they may involve positive obligations as well in the case one has 
violated one’s original duty of forbearance. 
 
 Restricting the scope of our duties to negative duties of forbearance, however, seems rather 
limited. For this reason, certain authors have made the case for positive duties of aid by relying on 
remedial responsibility: our individual duties regarding subsistence needs are not limited to mere 
forbearance, but instead we have a duty to alleviate suffering whenever it is within our means to do so.6 
Perhaps the best-known example of remedial responsibility can be found in the work of Peter Singer. In 
Famine, Affluence, and Morality he develops his central moral principle: “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, 
we ought, morally, to do it.”7 He subsequently illustrates the validity of this principle by applying it to a 
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concrete case. If I happen to walk by a shallow pond, in which I spot a drowning child, I ought to go 
into the pond and rescue the child. It is, after all, in my power to prevent something bad (the child 
drowning) from happening and the costs (getting my clothes wet, perhaps catching a cold) by no means 
qualify as “anything of comparable moral importance.” We can therefore readily arrive at the conclusion 
that I ought to rescue the child. If we accept this principle in the case of the drowning child, Singer 
continues, we can also apply it to the problem of global poverty. The citizens of wealthy nations could 
save many lives threatened by poverty worldwide by contributing money, and doing so would not 
require the sacrifice of anything equally morally important compared to the value of being free from 
poverty. Yet, how much ought we to give? Singer replies that “we ought to give until we reach the level 
of marginal utility – that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to 
myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gifts.”8 Anticipating the criticism that this duty would 
be too demanding, Singer formulates a more moderate version (though he believes the strong account 
to be correct): “We should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something 
morally significant.”9 In this version, it is not necessary for us to give until we reach the level of 
marginal utility, for reducing oneself and one’s dependents to that level may be viewed as sacrificing 
something morally significant.  
 
 The utilitarian basis of this argument is clear: “We ought to be preventing as much suffering as 
we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance.”10 Note that it is hereby 
irrelevant how global poverty is caused or who has caused it. These questions are deemed beside the 
point, as the utilitarian position espoused by Singer does not recognize any morally relevant difference 
between harming and refraining from helping. In the end, the utilitarian Singer is concerned with the 
total sum. Solving the problem of global poverty is therefore simply a matter of adding and subtracting: 
that which the wealthy nations have in overabundance must be transferred to the poorer nations until 
the wealthy nations have reached a point where giving more would have (morally significant) negative 
consequences for themselves. Thus a position as Singer’s, which relies on remedial responsibility, can, 
in contrast to outcome responsibility, account for positive duties of aid in cases where no one is to 
blame, as, for example, when a country is struck by a tsunami or some other natural disaster.11 Those 
who have the means to help others in need, ought to do so. Conceivably, however, we could still allow 
for gradations of duty by taking into account specific circumstances and special relations between 
people(s). For example, we could argue that those people of country c, which has been struck by a 
natural disaster, who are able to help, have a stronger duty to help their compatriots than other people 
(from different parts of the world) do. Citizens of countries bordering on c, as well as those citizens 
whose country has close historical ties to c, might be next in line, as far as the strength of the duty to aid 
the inhabitants of c is concerned. These gradations of duties do not, however, imply that others – who 
are neither inhabitants of c nor of a neighboring country nor of a country that has strong historic ties to c 
– are exempted of all duties to aid the inhabitants of c, provided they are able to do so (it would be odd 
to place a duty on those who themselves are in need of aid). 
 
Positive duties of aid are, however, not limited to cases such as these, where no one is to blame. 
It may also occur that the poverty of agent x is a consequence of breaches of agent y’s negative duty of 
forbearance, which however she refuses to remedy. In such a case, the positive duty to aid x might fall 
to a third party (z) instead. Again, such a duty cannot be accounted for if one relies solely on outcome 
responsibility (after all, it is not z who is responsible for x’s indigence). Remedial responsibility, by 
contrast, simply requires agents to help others whenever it is in their power to do so, irrespective of the 
cause of others’ lack, and thus can account for z’s duty to help x. As in the discussion above of our duties 
to the inhabitants of the calamity-stricken country c, there may be gradations of duty here as well, 
depending on the relation one has to x. 
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Both the negative duty of forbearance and the positive duties of aid, discussed above, have relied 
on what Thomas Pogge has called a traditional, interactionist account of human rights, according to 
which human rights impose duties on individuals not to harm and duties of aid. The main defect of this 
position, Pogge maintains, is that it is unable to account for the most important duty regarding 
subsistence needs, which is institutional in nature.12 Our fundamental individual duty corresponding 
with human rights is, on Pogge’s account: 
 
a duty not to contribute to the coercive imposition of any institutional order that 
avoidably fails to realize human rights, unless one also compensates for one’s 
contribution by working toward appropriate institutional reforms or toward 
shielding the victims of injustice from the harms one helps produce.13 
   
This duty arises from Pogge’s institutional approach (which he adopts instead of the interactionist 
position), which maintains that human rights are in the first place claims on social institutions and in the 
second place claims on all those who are involved in maintaining such institutions.14 Given that the 
world in which we live constitutes a global institutional order, it follows, furthermore, that the duty 
here described falls on all persons everywhere, but especially on the more influential and privileged,15 
because they presumably have contributed to and benefited from this institutional order more than 
others. The citizens of wealthy nations are thus not simply innocent bystanders, but rather they 
(knowingly or unknowingly) cooperate in a system that causes and maintains poverty in other parts of 
the world, to their own advantage. Insofar as we have in this manner caused the harm of others, we are 
co-responsible for their suffering.  
 
Note that our principal duty regarding others’ subsistence needs is a negative duty not to 
participate in a global system that causes and perpetuates poverty.16 It is for this reason, Pogge claims, 
that his institutional account maintains the middle ground between two extreme positions.17 On the one 
side, minimalist interactional libertarians would argue that we carry no responsibility for violations of 
rights that we did not cause directly, whereas, on the other side, maximalist interactional utilitarians 
(such as Singer) hold that we are responsible for all deprivations everywhere as long as we have not 
given everything we can give, regardless of our causal relation to said deprivations. Pogge maintains the 
libertarian point that we only have negative duties of justice towards others, without concluding that we 
therefore have no duties at all towards the global poor. Initially, our duty of justice towards the poor is 
“merely” to not participate in an institutional order that systematically breaches the right to be free from 
poverty. Once we have violated this right, however, we acquire “negative-duty-generated positive 
obligations”18 to actively work for institutional reform and to provide compensation aimed towards 
poverty alleviation.  
 
The major innovation of Pogge’s theory of human rights is its institutional approach. The 
correlative duties are not limited to avoiding direct harm. Instead, we are under a negative duty to 
refrain from participating in a harmful system. This duty involves informing oneself about the manner in 
which the global order operates and the effects it has on people’s lives. Pogge cleverly claims that he 
only recognizes such negative duties of justice: we need merely refrain from harming others, whereby 
the novelty is that harming must be understood in an institutional and not in an interactional manner. 
His principle of justice has also been referred to as the “cause principle:”19 Pogge holds that we are 
responsible for global poverty, because and only insofar as we have caused it. The almost libertarian 
appearance of his position regarding global justice is deceptive, however. For the negative duty to 
refrain from participating in an unjust order is such that it cannot possibly be fulfilled. Unless one 
withdraws from society entirely, one will be implicated in the preservation of the unjust order and, 
consequently, inevitably incur obligations to remedy the harm caused and to help push for reform. 
Given that the negative duty postulated by Pogge can therefore not be fulfilled (as I will argue 
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elaborately in the next section), positive duties were part of his account all along, except for the fact 
that they now appear in the guise of “voluntarily” incurred obligations. 
 
 By merely relying on outcome responsibility, Pogge can thus account not only for the negative 
duties to refrain from both direct and institutional harm, but also, given that the negative duty of an 
institutional nature is impossible to fulfill, for positive duties of aid and reform. What he cannot account 
for, however, given that he relies exclusively on outcome responsibility, are positive duties of aid in 
situations where either no one at all is responsible or at least I myself am not to blame.20 
 
The above brief discussion of Singer and Pogge, whose two accounts of our duties to the global 
poor have been extremely influential, has uncovered the various duties we have regarding the 
fulfillment of subsistence needs worldwide. The goal of this section has not been to judge the status of 
these duties, which will be undertaken next, but rather to provide a complete overview of our 
individual duties arising from subsistence needs. We may distinguish three separate causes of the non-
fulfillment of subsistence needs, which trigger either remedial or outcome responsibility resulting in 
either negative or positive duties (or both):21 
 
1. If poverty is caused by a natural disaster, or some other calamity for which no one is to be 
blamed, then all who are able to help nonetheless have positive duties of aid. The ‘weight’ of 
the duty, however, may depend on specific circumstances and special relations between 
people(s). This duty relies on our remedial responsibilities.  
2. If the cause of poverty is some directly harmful action (e.g. the burning of agricultural lands by 
an invading army), then (a) the agent who committed this direct harm has a positive duty to 
remedy (and, of course, a negative duty to refrain from further harming). Here we can rely on 
outcome responsibility. If that agent refuses or is unable to remedy the situation, we might (b) 
pass the positive duties of aid on to other, capable agents, in which case we would rely on 
remedial responsibility. In this case as well (as with duty 1), we allow for the possibility of 
different gradations of duties, depending on the specific circumstances and the special relations 
between people and countries. 
3. In the case of unfulfilled subsistence needs as a consequence of an unjust (global) politico-
economic order, we have a negative duty to refrain from participating in that order as well as 
positive obligations of direct aid and reform if we are unable to fulfill our negative duty. These 
duties are allocated by relying solely on outcome responsibility. 
 
This results in the following schema of all our possible individual duties concerning the fulfillment of 
subsistence needs:  
 
Cause of poverty Who has duties? What duties? Basis for 
according duties 
1. Natural disaster 
(no one is to blame) 
All, but gradations of 
duty and ability to 
help are taken into 
account 
Positive duties of aid Remedial 
responsibility 
2. Direct harm a. The agent that has 
harmed 
 
a. Negative duties to 
refrain from harming 
and positive duties to 
remedy 
a. Outcome 
responsibility 
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b. All, but gradations 
of duty and ability to 
help are taken into 
account 
b. Positive duties of 
aid 
 
b. Remedial 
responsibility  
3. (Global) 
institutional harm 
All those 
participating in the 
institutional scheme 
Negative duty to 
refrain from 
participating in unjust 
schemes. Otherwise, 
positive duties to 
remedy and reform 
are incurred 
Outcome 
responsibility 
Figure 1 
 
What this overview does not show, however, is the status of these duties. The question whether such 
duties are perfect or imperfect, duties of justice or duties of virtue, will therefore be treated next. 
 
 
II. What is the status of our duties concerning the fulfillment of subsistence needs? 
 
This section will separately discuss each of the duties in the schema provided at the end of the 
previous section in order to ascertain the status of our duties as individuals to the global poor. First, 
however, we must provide adequate definitions of the relevant terms that are subsequently to be 
applied to the duties listed in figure 1. Accordingly, this section will commence by clarifying the 
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as well as the division between duties of justice and 
duties of virtue. 
 
Over two thousand years ago Cicero briefly summarized the problem of our duties to the needy 
by observing that “the resources of the individual are limited, whereas there is a numberless crowd of 
those in need of them.”22 Throughout the history of practical philosophy such thoughts have led to the 
conclusion that our duties to the needy are greatly underdetermined (and potentially overdemanding). 
Kant would argue that the lack of determinacy stems from the fact that our duties to the needy do not 
prescribe particular actions, but rather specific maxims for action. There is therefore a certain measure of 
latitude (Spielraum) concerning the manner of their fulfillment:23 how one should act, as well as how 
much one is to do for whom, is not precisely determined. These matters are therefore largely at the 
agent’s discretion. It follows, according to this train of thought, that duties of aid are imperfect.  
 
 Our current understanding of the perfect-imperfect distinction finds it origin in the work of the 
17th century Dutch jurist and legal philosopher Hugo Grotius,24 as does the habit of connecting perfect 
rights and duties to justice and imperfect rights and duties to virtue. Thus, according to Grotius, rights 
that may be enforced, and the violation of which constitutes a wrong, are perfect in nature, whereas 
imperfect rights may not be enforced, nor is anyone wronged by their violation.25 Having some moral 
reason to see a duty performed is therefore not enough to render the duty perfect. Only if we have a 
perfect right to its performance does its non-fulfillment constitute a violation of justice. Otherwise, the 
duty in question is imperfect and its fulfillment is a matter not of justice, but virtue (“Liberality, 
Gratitude, Compassion, or Charity”).26 
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The German philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf adopts Grotius’s distinction and develops it 
further. He views perfect rights as those warranting the use of force (i.e. legal action in a civil state or, 
between States, war) against those who would violate them.27 By contrast, the performance of imperfect 
duties, such as “duties of humanity, beneficence, and gratitude,”28 cannot be extorted by force. The 
reason why, according to Pufendorf, perfect rights and duties are and ought to be enforceable, is that 
the performance of perfect duties and the protection of perfect rights are necessary if society is to exist 
at all. Imperfect rights and duties, on the other hand, contribute only to society’s wellbeing. There thus 
appears to be a hierarchy of duties: society could very well continue to exist without the performance of 
imperfect duties, whereas perfect duties are paramount to its survival. Given the importance of perfect 
duties for the very being of society, they ought to be enforceable; no such need, however, pertains to 
imperfect duties. Finally, Pufendorf maintains that imperfect duties are not as clearly defined as perfect 
duties; in the case of the provision of goods, for example, imperfect duties do “not consider whether 
that which is furnished is equal or not to that on account of which something is owed.”29 In the case of 
imperfect duties the agent can therefore not rely on clear legal prescriptions, but must instead follow 
her own “sense of decency and conscience.”30 How much one ought to give, is thus left up to the 
discretion of the agent. In sum, perfect rights and duties are characterized by enforceability and 
precision, whereas unenforceability and lack of precision are traits associated rather with imperfect 
rights and duties.31 The former are, moreover, of more fundamental importance for society than the 
latter. 
  
The contemporary understanding of the perfect-imperfect distinction is roughly the same. The 
prevalence of the idea that imperfect duties are somehow of lesser importance becomes apparent from 
the great pains several authors go to in order to prove that subsistence needs do not “merely” give rise 
to imperfect duties, but should instead be situated within the realm of justice.32 Similarly, both the 
(im)precision component33 and the (un)enforceability, or rather the (un)claimability component are to 
this day common characteristics of the perfect-imperfect distinction: who bears the duty, what the 
content of the duty is and for whom the duty-bearer must perform it, all this is clearly determined in 
the case of perfect duties. By contrast, if one of these points remains indeterminate we have to do with 
an imperfect duty. Thus, when either the duty-bearer has not been identified, the content of the duty 
has not been specified (leaving the duty-bearer with a measure of latitude concerning the manner in 
which she will fulfill her duty), or the person for whom the duty must be performed has not been 
singled out, then the duty in question is imperfect. As a consequence of their determinateness, perfect 
duties are claimable: the right-holder can identify the duty-bearer(s) and claim the performance of a 
specific duty from her (or them). In the case of imperfect duties, instead, it is not clear how to pair up 
right-holders and duty-bearers, nor what the content of the duties is precisely.  
 
  In examining the four duties from the schema provided at the end of the previous section, I will 
mainly attempt to answer the question whether the duty under consideration is a duty of justice or a 
duty of virtue. Though I do not believe these terms to be strictly synonymous with perfect and 
imperfect duties34  respectively, I will hold that imperfect duties cannot be duties of justice. 35  My 
understanding of duties of justice, furthermore, can be briefly summarized as follows: if there is a right, 
then there is a duty of justice, the performance of which is owed to the right-holder and the non-
fulfillment of which constitutes a wrong.36 If, therefore, a duty may be weighed against a different duty, 
or the agent may freely choose which aspect of the duty to fulfill without committing a wrong, then the 
duty in question cannot be a duty of justice, but must instead be taken to be a duty of virtue.37 
 
 With these definitions in mind, let us proceed to examine the status of the duty to refrain from 
(global) institutional harm. 
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Duty to refrain from direct harm 
 
I will start with the least contentious of the duties listed in the schema above, namely the duty 
to refrain from direct38 harm and to remedy the harm caused (duty 2.a). The content of this classic 
Ulpian duty of neminem laedere (“do not harm anybody”) is unambiguous: I ought not to harm anyone. 
Accordingly, violations are easily detected, rendering this duty enforceable. Requiring merely 
forbearance, this duty can, furthermore, be easily performed by all for all and is thus universal. We may 
therefore conclude that this universal, perfect duty is indeed a duty of justice. When, however, this 
negative duty is violated (say the agent is a member of a rebel group and, as such, takes part in the 
burning of the farmlands of the rebels’ enemies), the duty-bearer incurs positive duties of remedy. 
Though the content of such duties would need to be specified for each case (depending on the gravity of 
the offence and, if several agents were involved, one’s part in the violation), they are nonetheless duties 
of justice, as they are incurred as a direct consequence of the violation of the duty of justice to refrain 
from direct harm. Furthermore, the duty-bearer and the person(s) to whom compensation is owed are 
clearly identifiable. The precise content of such positive duties of reparation could be specified by a 
court of law, for example. 
 
 This seemingly straightforward duty could, however, be rendered more complicated by arguing 
that the duty to refrain from harming also includes the duty to exercise one’s rights in a responsible 
manner. In a manner analogous to, say, the right to freedom of expression,39 the right to (acquire) 
property, for example, is limited by the rights of others. If one exercises this right in such a manner that 
there remains little to nothing left for others, then one has exercised one’s right without due respect for 
the equal rights of others. This Lockean duty40 would exclude such practices as land grabbing, i.e. the 
buying up of enormous swaths of land in developing countries by foreign companies or governments. 
This example shows how harming by exercising one’s right without due respect for the rights of others 
may also be a perfect duty: no one is permitted to acquire such quantities of land as would endanger the 
ability of others to fulfill their subsistence needs. This duty requires merely forbearance and can thus 
easily be performed by all for all; it is therefore universal. The content of the duty is specific enough, 
though it may, as in the case of the right to freedom of expression, require further fleshing out. As with 
the right to freedom of expression, whether one has exceeded the limits of one’s right to property 
could be determined case by case by a court of law. In general terms, however, the duty is clear enough 
to be considered determinate and claimable: everyone has a duty to refrain from acquiring such an 
amount of property that renders impossible the acquisition of an equitable share by others. Accordingly, 
the duty to refrain from harming by exercising one’s right to property without due respect for the rights 
of others is a genuine duty of justice. 
 
Duty to refrain from (global) institutional harm 
 
This duty lies at the core of Pogge’s account of our duties with regard to the subsistence needs 
of others. It consists in refraining from participating in unjust orders that foreseeably cause a lack of 
necessary subsistence goods. By violating this duty, one additionally acquires duties to remedy the harm 
caused and to push for reform. The negative duty to refrain from institutional harm is the only duty of 
justice Pogge recognizes (the duties to remedy and reform are in fact obligations incurred only upon 
violation of one’s duty of justice). The reason why, according to Pogge, justice contains solely negative 
duties, is because, given certain prejudices about negative and positive duties, he believes the former to 
be more widely accepted because they are viewed as more stringent and less demanding. Pogge claims 
that his conception of justice is limited in range, as it involves only those “subject to an institutional 
order you cooperate in imposing.” In a globalized world, however, this range could potentially 
encompass everyone. The range is thus not as limited as he lets on. Furthermore, Pogge maintains that 
this negative duty (including the two positive obligations) is limited in demandingness as well, since it is 
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restricted “to compensation for your share of that part of the human rights deficit that is reasonably 
avoidable through an alternative institutional design.” 41  It is this supposedly limited demandingness 
especially that I mean to challenge.42 
 
 Pogge’s insistence that justice contains only negative duties is meant to appease critics of 
subsistence rights who worry that the correlative duties are overly demanding. Indeed, traditionally, 
negative duties have been held to have certain advantages over positive duties: they require only 
forbearance (not positive action), they are universally applicable (all can fulfill them towards all), they 
are enforceable, and their fulfillment is less costly and thus more compatible with maximal liberty. 
However, it would seem that this asymmetry between negative and positive duties does not apply when 
the negative duties are of an institutional nature, as in the case of Pogge. Refraining from harming in a 
globalized world is not so easy as simply refraining from performing acts most of us would not even 
consider doing anyway (theft, sexual assault, murder). Instead, to refrain from harming others requires 
our unending vigilance: Is this T-shirt made by a child in a sweatshop? Are these oranges produced in 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank? Should I take shorter and less warm showers? Should I eat less 
meat, because the production of meat is an incredibly inefficient use of farmland? Are my savings being 
invested in weapons manufacturers by my bank? Are my taxes being used by my government to wage an 
unjust war? This is just a fraction of the questions we could ask ourselves every day, but this short list of 
concerns will suffice to show that not harming demands our constant attention. To completely avoid 
contributing to and benefiting from the global unjust order thus appears to be a Herculean task. It 
involves informing oneself about the possible consequences of one’s behavior – in collaboration with the 
actions of many other agents – for people in distant lands whom one has most likely never met. The 
paradigm of harming has thus become very different from the traditional one, whereby one’s actions by 
themselves are sufficient to cause harm without the contribution of others, and the harmful effects of 
one’s actions are immediate and near.43 The advantages of negative over positive duties only apply to 
this classic picture of harming. Pogge, however, abandons this picture and proposes a new, institutional 
account without wishing to give up the advantages of the classic account (stringency, reasonable 
demandingness, universality). His theory is thus presented as far less demanding that it is in reality.  
 
Assuming one is able to figure out all the harmful consequences of one’s participation in unjust 
schemes, the question still remains whether or not one can reasonably avoid participating in such a 
scheme. The language of negative duty conceals the incredibly demanding nature of this command: to 
absolutely refrain from consuming any products that have been unfairly produced, for example, would 
already call for a major lifestyle change. But, supposing one’s government is involved in upholding 
unfair trade agreements, one would even be required to move to a different country, lest one 
contribute to one’s government’s harmful practices by paying taxes. If one does not succeed in finding a 
country with a completely innocent government, a real possibility I imagine, one would have to retreat 
from society altogether to avoid harming others. 
 
Pogge’s negative duty to refrain from institutional harm is therefore far more demanding than 
the classic duty of forbearance. In fact, one could imagine several positive duties of aid less demanding 
than Pogge’s negative duty. Since ought implies can, this negative duty must therefore be viewed as 
imperfect.44 Note that this is “not to be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions 
but only as permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g. love of one’s neighbor in general by 
love of one’s parents).”45 In other words, we do have an imperfect duty to act in light of a certain end – 
i.e. the end of avoiding institutional harm altogether – but the manner in which we fulfill this duty is to 
an extent at our discretion, and may be limited by other duties. 
 
Pogge’s duty to refrain from harming is, furthermore, less precise than it seems. Given that it is 
not always clear what I ought to do to refrain from harming, the content cannot be said to be 
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determinate. Pogge’s assertion that we “choose to remain ignorant”46 of the manner in which the world 
economy is structured, what role our government has in shaping it, and what consequences it has for 
others in the world, is I think a bit too quick. It is difficult, for example, to hold citizens of wealthy 
nations responsible for the policies developed by the IMF and the World Bank, given that the “IMF is 
accountable to finance ministers and central bank governors, and its officers are not elected but rather 
appointed by agreement of governments.”47 Debra Satz further points out that the policy debates of 
these organizations more often than not take place in secret, rendering it more difficult to obtain 
information. As long as one is not entirely clear on the policies of these international financial 
institutions, the content of one’s duties to refrain from participating in an unjust order shaped, in part, 
by these policies, will necessarily remain indeterminate and the duty itself therefore imperfect. 
 
It is difficult to imagine, moreover, how Pogge’s negative duty could be claimable. It would 
involve a specific victim, often in a different country, seeking out one of the many agents who 
contributed to the preservation of an unjust order that has caused her harm, as responsible for her 
condition. What justifies her claim on him specifically, when she might have placed her claim on so 
many possible others (that have likewise participated in the same order)? This question shows that the 
pairing of victim and violator, and thus claimability, has become problematic, another indication that 
the duty in question is imperfect. 
 
 The positive duties to remedy harm caused and to push for reform face a similar problem. It 
seems difficult for a particular person in need of assistance to claim aid or reform efforts from a specific 
duty-bearer. These positive duties, furthermore, are underdetermined in two ways. The first sense in 
which they are underdetermined concerns the question how much I ought to do. Pogge answers as 
follows: “The word ‘compensate’ is meant to indicate that how much one should be willing to 
contribute toward reforming unjust institutions and toward mitigating the harms they cause depends on 
how much one is contributing to, and benefiting from, their maintenance.”48 But how am I to measure 
how much I have contributed and benefited?49 And even if I could provide such an exact figure, how 
ought I then to translate that into aid and reform efforts? This brings us to the second sense in which 
Pogge’s positive duties are underdetermined: it is unclear whom ought I to help first and how much. 
Where should the focus of my reform efforts lie? 
 
 Given the global range of the harmful institutions in which one has participated, the persons for 
whom one might provide aid or for whose cause one might lobby and undertake reform efforts, are 
numerous: one could lobby to overhaul the EU agricultural subsidies, which render it impossible for 
African farmers to compete and make a living, given the extremely low prices of subsidized European 
agricultural produce. Yet, one could also provide direct aid to victims of an unjust war in which one’s 
country has participated, or dedicate one’s time and effort to any one of the many other cases of 
subsistence rights violations. Such reform efforts and aid require the seeking out of information about 
the region in which the problem has occurred, the nature of the problem in question, its causes, and 
effective ways of helping or reforming. It is possible for an individual to do this for one cause or perhaps 
two at a time, but certainly not for all the cases in which people suffer from poverty. Duties of aid and 
reform do not dictate which of these many possible cases I ought to focus on; this is thus a matter of 
discretion.  
 
Both the negative duty to refrain from upholding harmful institutions and the positive duties 
resulting from its violation are thus not sufficiently determinate, nor is it clear how right-holders could 
claim the performance of these duties. As a result, we must conclude that they are imperfect. Indeed, 
Elizabeth Ashford, whose position is in many ways similar to Pogge’s, admits that this is the case: in the 
absence of just institutions that can allocate and specify the duties, they remain imperfect.50 Nonetheless, 
Ashford maintains, they are (imperfect!) duties of justice. At this point, however, we ought to ask 
Theoria and Praxis, Volume 2, issue 1 
 11 
ourselves what we mean when we speak of ‘duties of justice.’ Unfortunately, more often than not this 
term is employed without the provision of a clear definition. Often it seems that the term ‘justice’ is 
simply used in order to convey that something is very important, whereby the possibility that certain 
duties may be of fundamental importance but are not matters of justice, is rejected out of hand. Indeed, 
the greater the number of duties that are given the predicate ‘duty of justice,’ the more all other duties 
seem to be devalued. Certain liberals even place the duty to treat “each as an end” within the sphere of 
basic justice,51 while Kant, from whom they presumably borrow this duty, clearly did not view this as a 
matter of justice (or right, Recht), as it fails to fulfill the first condition of right (namely that it regards 
only the external actions of individuals, insofar as they can affect others).  
 
We will thus need to define duties of justice more precisely.52 The common idea that duties of 
justice are perfect and duties of virtue imperfect has been contested of late. Instead, some scholars have 
made the argument that the imperfect duties under discussion here are duties of justice that ought to be 
made perfect.53 This duty to develop institutional structures that can define and allocate imperfect 
duties, rendering them perfect and enforceable, is itself imperfect as well. Nonetheless, this too is held 
to be a duty of justice. Yet, if it is no longer the perfection of duties that places them within the sphere 
of justice, what criterion for duties of justice is used instead? A second traditional approach to the 
distinction, found in the work of Pogge and in the writings of most libertarians, holds that only negative 
duties can be duties of justice. This theory has also been rejected, however, since the positive duties to 
aid and reform are considered to be duties of justice as well. Alternatively, a third option would be to 
make an appeal to the claimability of the duties. Yet, again this suggestion is turned down. After all, 
these scholars regard duties to reform and aid, as well as duties to not participate in harmful institutions, 
as duties of justice despite the fact that they are not claimable at present. Finally, duties of justice have 
often been held to be those duties that have corresponding rights. It is this definition to which these 
authors appeal: the right to an adequate standard of living exists, because it protects a fundamental 
human interest.54 This right then gives rise to duties that, though they are of an imperfect nature, are 
nonetheless considered to be duties of justice, precisely because they arise from a right. It is the 
importance of the right in question, furthermore, which leads to calls for institutionalization so as to 
render the duties perfect, lest the rights remain unfulfilled: 
  
It is therefore not true that an institutional specification of duties is a condition of 
the right’s existence. The right exists, and imposes corresponding obligations, 
even in the absence of any institutional allocation of duties. In particular, it 
imposes […] the corresponding duty to coordinate with others to bring about an 
institutional allocation of duties that realizes the right, insofar as this is reasonably 
possible.55 
 
Here it must be clarified, however, how the term ‘right’ is utilized in this line of argument. Crucially, 
this understanding of right does not connect having a right to X with a right to coerce others to provide 
you with X. After all, prior to institutionalization the latter right does not exist.56 Rather, a right to X 
seems to give rise to what is referred to as an “imperfect duty of justice” to set up institutions that can 
make possible such enforcement of the duties to aid and reform.  
 
On the account I have put forward at the beginning of this section, if there is a right, then there 
is a duty of justice, the performance of which is owed to the right-holder and the non-fulfillment of 
which wrongs her. A right to subsistence, however – given the impossibility of the negative duty to 
wholly refrain from participating in unjust institutions – generates duties of aid and reform, which I 
have argued cannot be performed by all for all. I will thus have to choose whom I will aid and for which 
cause I will lobby for institutional reform. It seems to me, however, that if I choose to help needy 
persons A and B, and, due to human finitude, am not able to help all the others who are equally 
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deserving of my help, I do not wrong those that I have not helped. But if we accept this line of argument, 
then we would also have to accept that there is such a thing as a right, whereby the non-performance of 
its correlative duty does not constitute a wrong towards the holder of this right. 57  Yet this is 
problematic, for normally those duties that one can refrain from performing without wronging anyone 
are considered to be duties of virtue: “failure to fulfill them [i.e. duties of virtue] is not in itself culpability 
(demeritum) = – a, but rather mere deficiency in moral worth = 0.”58 Therefore it seems, thus far, that the 
duties correlative to the right to subsistence (as described in the institutional account) are, in fact, duties 
of virtue. 
 
Still, those who view these imperfect duties as duties of justice could argue that the right to 
subsistence is in fact not held against particular individuals, but rather “against the vast group of agents 
who participate in these [unjust] social institutions.”59 The right-holder thus has a right that the wealthy 
coordinate as a group to fulfill her right. This would do away with the argument based on human finitude, 
for conceivably if the wealthy would coordinate their relief and reform efforts they would in fact 
succeed in fulfilling subsistence rights for all. There would be no need for picking and choosing aid 
recipients (which leads to the suspicion that subsistence rights correlate with duties of virtue, as 
discussed in the previous paragraph), because as a group they could fulfill the subsistence rights of all. 
But even if we grant that this is possible, the worry would be that rights held against an amorphous and 
anonymous group will de facto not be claimable. After all, without institutions the question remains 
where concretely one’s claim can be lodged when one’s right has not yet been fulfilled. The answer that 
the wealthy of the world as a group are responsible does not help us much: “Claimants who do not 
know who bears the counterpart obligations to rights they claim may grasp thin air.”60 It seems this 
warning applies to the case of ‘group duties’ as well. Placing the correlative duty on the shoulders of a 
collective may conceivably solve the problem of finitude, but it leaves the question “Who should do 
what for whom?” unanswered. Rights held against groups thus do not provide clear guidelines for 
individual agency. 
 
Should we then conclude that our individual, institutional duties to the global poor are “merely” 
duties of virtue? They are, as we have argued, (1) indeterminate: which duty-bearers must perform 
which duties for which right-holder(s) remains unclear. As a consequence, they are (2) not claimable: if 
one does not know who owes what to whom, how is one to claim anything? Consequently, the duties to 
the poor appear to have (3) no correlative rights, since we understand having a right to mean one has a 
right to coerce another to perform a certain duty. Given these three characteristics it seems we must 
conclude that our duties concerning global subsistence needs are duties of virtue.61 
 
There remains, however, a crucial difference between our individual duties stemming from 
subsistence needs and traditional duties of virtue: the latter are not typically performed as recompense 
for an injustice for which one is (co)responsible. Regarding global poverty, however, I believe Pogge 
can be credited with having convincingly demonstrated that, in fact, we are implicated in this injustice. 
If we accept this, then it seems unsatisfying to classify these duties as duties of virtue. Yet, judging them 
to be genuine duties of justice also seems inaccurate (as argued above). If we are to overcome this 
stalemate, we should recall that, at least according to the account I have provided, duties of justice are 
limited to those duties that correlate with a corresponding right to coerce.62 Given that the duties in 
question are imperfect and therefore not claimable, it cannot be meaningfully held that these duties give 
rise to such a right. A human right to subsistence – whereby ‘right’ must be understood as consisting in 
the ability to coerce the duty-bearer to perform the correlative duty – thus becomes problematic.  
 
Proponents of this human right will undoubtedly view this as an undesirable conclusion. They 
could argue that the victims of the unjust global order thus appear to be punished twice: first their 
subsistence needs remain unfulfilled due to the workings of the unfair global basic structure and 
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subsequently we conclude that they are unable to make claims of justice on those participating in and 
benefiting from that same global order, simply because its complexity renders the pairing of victim and 
violator extremely difficult.63 I am not insensitive to this criticism. And I by no means conclude that we 
have no duties to the global poor. Rather, we do have strong duties to aid the global poor and strive for 
reform, but I argue these duties at present fall outside the scope of justice.  
 
We should be careful not to employ certain words and concepts too easily: if we speak of a 
human right to subsistence, but the right-holder is unable to claim the performance of the 
corresponding duty from a specific duty-bearer, then one could wonder about the point of speaking of a 
right. If we speak of duties of justice, but it is utterly unclear what one ought to do for whom, then the 
meaning of ‘justice’ has been altered to a point where it comes suspiciously close to virtue. The term 
‘duty of justice’ should add something that sets it apart from duties of virtue. As argued above however, 
the structure of the institutional duties stemming from global subsistence needs is too similar to duties 
of virtue to be able to speak of duties of justice. If a duty is indeterminate and unclaimable it seems 
misleading to speak of duties of justice. This term creates expectations that, at present, can simply not 
be fulfilled.64 
 
Duties of a Remedial Nature 
 
Thus far we have dealt with situations in which subsistence rights are unfulfilled as a consequence of 
either direct or institutional harm. We have found that the duty to refrain from direct harm is a duty of 
justice, whereas the duty to refrain from institutional harm and the positive duties one incurs upon 
violation of this duty (i.e. the duties to provide aid and push for reform) are duties of virtue. What 
remains is to discuss the cases in which the lack of subsistence goods is either no one’s fault (duty 1), or 
at least not my fault (duty 2.b), and remedial duties kick in. We will begin by discussing the former. 
Consider the plight of a country struck by an environmental disaster (e.g. a volcanic eruption or a 
tsunami), leaving countless inhabitants without secure access to food and shelter. Let us further 
stipulate that this environmental disaster did not occur as a consequence of climate change caused by 
man. In other words, this is not a matter of institutional harming: no one is to blame. At first glance, 
this situation might perhaps appear analogous to Singer’s easy rescue case: we are not responsible for 
the trouble in which the child in the pond finds himself, but we are in a position to help and the rescue 
effort will not cost us any great effort or resources. Therefore, Singer concludes we have a duty to save 
the child. Similarly, the lack of subsistence goods in the afflicted country is not our doing, but if 
(wealthy) countries work together they could, conceivably, alleviate the country’s problems without 
too great a cost to themselves. This, however, is where the similarities end. In the easy rescue case it is 
clear who should do what for whom – I, the single passerby, should wade into the pond and save the 
child – rendering the duty in this example both perfect and possibly a duty of justice. In fact, several 
countries actually have such Good Samaritan laws, which include a duty to rescue. In the case of a 
natural disaster, by contrast, there are many possible candidates for the role of the Good Samaritan. 
Moreover, there could be various countries struck by natural disasters that are in need of our help.65 
Furthermore, we argued earlier on (in Section I) that the duty to aid others in need (for which no one is 
to blame) allows for gradations of duty, by taking into account the special circumstances of the duty-
bearer (is she able to help a lot or only a little, or perhaps not at all?) as well as the special relations 
between people and nations. The duty to assist in cases of a natural calamity is therefore 
underdetermined and unclaimable, hence imperfect. We must conclude, consequently, that the duty in 
question is a duty of virtue.  
 
 This is not to say that we do not have strong moral reasons to aid those in need. We indeed 
have significant duties of virtue to help them. But if we do not help them, or if we help others who are 
equally in need and deserving of our help, then we do not wrong them.66 For only if one has what 
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Grotius termed a “perfect right” to the performance of a duty does its non-fulfillment constitute a 
wrong and thus a violation of justice. Furthermore, the imperfect duty to aid others who, through no 
one’s fault, are in need of help can also become a perfect duty. Within a particular institutional scheme, 
the indigent can lodge their claim with a specified agency that assumes the duty of aid. All others in the 
scheme have the duty to cooperate with and contribute to this scheme. Thus when a fellow citizen, for 
example, has an accident, rendering her disabled and unable to work, the welfare state assumes the duty 
to ensure she is taken care of and has enough means to live her life. Indirectly, all the citizens share in 
this duty by complying with the welfare system and by paying taxes. In such a fashion an imperfect duty 
can be institutionalized and become a duty of justice. Somewhat analogously, countries could resolve to 
set up an international fund for disaster relief, under the supervision of the UN for instance, which 
could be relied on in cases of emergencies. In the case, however, where such an institutional structure is 
missing, individuals’ duties to aid are imperfect in nature, and thus duties of virtue. 
 
 It is likely that not everyone will agree with this assessment. In National Responsibility and Global 
Justice, for example, David Miller holds that such remedial duties do fall within the purview of justice, 
though he does not provide an explicit argument for this position. Even more curious, he argues that 
such duties “must be discharged as a matter of justice, assuming that the relevant agent or agents are 
able to do so without infringing other, weightier, duties of justice.”67 On a Kantian account, however, 
the “permission to limit one maxim of duty by another”68 forms a clear indication that the duties at hand 
are imperfect and hence not duties of justice. By admitting that there are weightier duties of justice and 
that precedence ought to be given to such duties in a possible case of conflict, Miller himself in fact 
already describes the remedial duties to aid others after a (natural) disaster as duties of virtue. His 
insistence that they are nonetheless duties of justice therefore seems merely stipulative. 
 
Finally, consider the duty (duty 2.b) pertaining to the following situation: a large part of a 
particular country’s GDP has the tendency to end up filling the large pockets of a small group of 
extremely wealthy and powerful oligarchs, who either reside within the upper echelons of the 
government or wield considerable influence on the administration’s policy through their political clients. 
As a result, large portions of the people of this country find themselves in need of poverty relief. 
Obviously, primary responsibility for their indigence lies with the band of oligarchs. They, however, 
have no intention of leaving their fraudulent ways behind them. The question thus arises whether 
individuals of the world’s wealthy nations have a duty of justice to assist those in need. 
 
 In addition to suffering from the same defects as the previously discussed remedial duty – i.e. 
being underdetermined and unclaimable, hence imperfect – the duties in question are, as it were, 
‘secondary.’ What I mean is that the duty to aid the inhabitants of this country originates in the failure 
of the primary duty-bearers. We are not to blame for the inhabitants’ indigence and our duties to help 
them do thus not stem from an injustice we have perpetrated against them for which we now owe them 
recompense. Given that the primary responsibility lies with the small group of oligarchs, Miller is right 
that the secondary duty-bearers “cannot be required to act.”69 Accordingly, the oligarchs’ refusal to fulfill 
their duty of justice to refrain from their harmful, fraudulent activities results in individuals elsewhere 
incurring not duties of justice, but rather duties of virtue to aid those in need. 
 
By applying the conclusions of this subsection to figure 1, we end up with the following 
schema: 
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Cause of 
poverty 
Who has 
duties? 
What duties? Basis for 
according 
duties 
Status of 
duties 
1. Natural 
disaster 
All, but 
gradations of 
duty and ability 
to help are taken 
into account. 
Positive duties 
of aid 
Remedial 
responsibility 
Duties of 
virtue70 
2. Direct harm a. The agent that 
has harmed 
 
 
b. All, but 
gradations of 
duty and ability 
to help are taken 
into account. 
a. Negative 
duties to refrain 
from harming 
and positive 
duties to remedy 
b. Positive 
duties of aid 
a. Outcome 
responsibility 
 
 
b. Remedial 
responsibility 
a. Duties of 
justice 
 
 
b. Duties of 
virtue 
3. (Global) 
institutional 
harm 
All those 
participating in 
the institutional 
scheme 
Negative duty to 
refrain from 
participating in 
unjust schemes, 
and positive 
duties to remedy 
and reform 
Outcome 
responsibility 
Duties of virtue 
Figure 2 
 
As this overview shows, we have found that in the absence of institutions to determine and allocate 
individual duties to the poor, most of these are best understood as duties of virtue. No doubt this result 
will be considered disappointing by those authors wishing to establish hard duties of justice to alleviate 
subsistence needs. However, I hope to have shown that if the concept ‘justice’ is to be a fruitful concept, 
it ought to be clearly distinct from its partner concept ‘virtue.’ Accordingly, I have suggested that the 
realm of justice be limited to those rights and duties that fulfill the conditions of determinacy and 
claimability. If we were to abandon these prerequisites, then the important distinction between justice 
and virtue would be rendered obscure, resulting in “duties of justice” that are either indeterminate or 
unclaimable, or both. What could be the motivation for such an approach? Many authors wish to avoid 
what they view as the stigma of having the duties stemming from subsistence needs branded as duties of 
virtue, as they believe these to be of lesser importance than duties of justice. They therefore insist in 
classifying our duties to the poor as duties of justice in order to emphasize the fact that we truly have 
very strong reasons to fulfill certain duties to the poor. In doing so, however, they forget that duties of 
virtue provide us with strong moral reasons for certain courses of action as well. In fact, they are of 
fundamental importance and serve an indispensable role as complement to (duties of) justice.  
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III. Conclusion 
 
We started our study of the duties arising from subsistence needs by providing, in Section I, an 
overview of all the possible individual duties concerning the fulfillment of subsistence needs (see figure 
1). We distinguished three separate causes of the non-fulfillment of subsistence needs, which trigger 
either remedial or outcome responsibility resulting in either negative or positive duties (or both). 
Subsequently, the need arose to clarify the status of these duties. This task was undertaken in Section II. 
As a first step, we expounded the difference between perfect and imperfect duties. The conclusion was 
that perfect duties are determinate (i.e. it is clear who is to do what for whom) and claimable, whereas 
imperfect duties possess the opposite properties. Following these definitions, the duties springing from 
subsistence needs were deemed imperfect, save for the duty to refrain from directly depriving others’ 
means of subsistence. We argued, furthermore, that duties of justice are those duties that (can) have 
corresponding rights to coerce. Duties of virtue, by contrast, do not have such corresponding rights, 
since they do not specify who may claim what from whom. We therefore concluded that all the duties 
relative to subsistence needs (save for the duty to refrain from direct harm) are duties of virtue.  
 
 This conclusion should lead neither to the belief that therefore our duties to the global poor are 
not important, nor that these duties of virtue cannot become duties of justice. Regarding the latter 
point, we could say that our conclusion that under present circumstances these duties are duties of 
virtue underlines the importance of the creation of institutions and legislation that can specify and 
allocate duties, perhaps rendering them duties of justice one day. Miller, too, views the creation of 
certain global institutions that can distribute our sundry duties to fulfill the subsistence needs of the 
global poor as the only way in which what he terms the “justice gap”71 can be narrowed, even if it can 
perhaps not be entirely filled. Indeed, the importance of allocating institutions in general is 
underwritten by those involved in human rights practice as well. They would argue that a good way to 
guarantee subsistence rights is by enshrining the right to food, for example, in the country’s 
constitution.72 An even better solution, however, is to draft so-called framework legislation73 on the 
right to food. As the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization states:  
 
A framework law on the right to food can give a precise definition of the scope and 
content of this human right, set out obligations for state authorities and private 
actors, establish necessary institutional mechanisms and give the legal basis for 
subsidiary legislation and other necessary measures to be taken by the competent 
state authorities.74 
 
The necessity to render duties perfect by implementing national or international legislation is thus 
clearly recognized. The hope is that by embedding subsistence rights, such as the right to food, within 
an institutional and legal setting, its fulfillment will be guaranteed. 
 
 No institutional scheme or set of laws is perfect, however. There will always be cases that slip 
through the cracks. Even institutional schemes that are largely just and generally complied with will not 
be able to completely prevent cases of unfulfilled rights. It is here that the importance of duties of virtue 
lies: when there are no institutions to allocate duties and ensure their performance (as is the case, I have 
argued, with our current duties to the global poor), or such institutions do not function flawlessly 
(which will, most likely, always be the case), duties of virtue function as a necessary and indispensable 
complement to the sphere of justice. Our duties of virtue include, among others, duties to help those 
who, as said, slip through the cracks and duties to push for reform of the prevailing institutions so that 
fewer cracks remain.  
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The creation of and compliance with just institutions, i.e. justice, is not enough. It is, to say the 
least, doubtable that the liberal dream of just institutions without virtuous people, can be realized. 
Virtue therefore remains necessary. Contrary to common opinion, therefore, our conclusion that (most 
of) our individual duties to the global poor are duties of virtue is by no means meant to derogate 
anything from their importance. Rather, it can be viewed as a reassertion of the value of (duties of) 
virtue. 
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